Bankruptcy Law : a Mechanism of Governance for Financially Distressed Firms
- Bertrand Chopard
- Eric Langlais
Régis Blazy & Bertrand Chopard & Agnès Fimayer, 2007. « Bankruptcy Law: a Mechanism of Governance for Financially Distressed Firms, » Working Papers of BETA 2007-33, Bureau d’Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
This paper explores the various governance models for financially distressed firms. We offer a new typology of major bankruptcy models and provide a connection between this bankruptcy law puzzle and the variables depicting the governance of healthy firms in order to shed light on two topics: (1) the factors that the lawyer should consider before removing its national bankruptcy law, and (2) the risks associated with each bankruptcy model according to the economic literature on bankruptcy law. Our final aim is to test whether the various bankruptcy models detailed in the paper perform in separate economic and legal environments.Télécharger le document de travail[/su_button]