Auteur :

• Bertrand Chopard
• Eric Langlais

 

Extrait

Chopard, Bertrand & Langlais, Eric, 2007. « Renégociation stratégique de la dette, risque comptable et risque juridique
[Strategic Bankruptcy with accountable and judicial risks], » MPRA Paper 4805, University Library of Munich, Germany.

This paper studies the influence of bankruptcy law (depending on whether the law is pro-lenders or pro-borrowers) on the borrowers propensity to demand the renegotiation of their debt, when there exist an asymmetrical information between lenders and borrowers. In the tradition of Law & Economics, we proceed to a study of impact for the main parameters of the model that capture the design of bankruptcy law, showing their influence on the probability of strategic bankruptcy and on the social welfare.

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