Crowdfunding with overenthusiastic investors: a global game model
Crowdfunding platforms are providing funds to an increasing number of projects, among which many have a strong social/community impact. Under a all-or-nothing program, the success of the investment depends on the ability of a crowd of potential investors to put their funds into the project without an explicit coordination device. With heterogeneous information, such a problem can be analyzed as a typical global game. We assume that signals of at least some agents present a systematic positive bias, driven by positive emotions about projects with high social/community impact. The analysis reveals that if the number of such overenthusiastic persons is large enough, crowdfunding nance might support nancially inefficient projects. We then analyze how a monopolistic platform optimally determines transaction fees and unveil the relationship between overenthusiasm and the pro t of the platform.
Crowdfunding, entrepreneurship, global games, overenthusiasm, behavioral IO.